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Introduction
The “peculiar” economics of sports (Neale, 1964) has always raised governance ques-
tions.1 It has been widely accepted that the championship race, being the joint prod-
uct of the participating clubs, requires more than the degree of regulation typical for
other industries (Noll, 2006). In recent years this sports governance discussion has
intensified significantly with respect to European football leagues due to the general
perception that they were going through a severe financial crisis. Important contribu-
tions studying the link between governance and finance have been for example made
by Baroncelli and Lago (2006) for Italian football, Buraimo, Simmons, and Szymanski
(2006) for English football, Gouguet and Primault (2006) and Andreff (2007) for
French football, and Frick and Prinz (2006) and Dietl and Franck (2007a) for German
football. Typically the sports governance discussion focuses the level of the league or
industry.2
This paper is different because it aims to present a governance discussion, which
focuses instead on the club level. It abstracts from league or industry governance
structures by treating them as elements of the environment, in which clubs operate.
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Abstract
Based on the analysis of the specific environment in which football clubs compete,
this paper presents a comparative institutional analysis of three paradigmatic struc-
tures of football club governance: privately owned football firms, public football cor-
porations (stock corporations with dispersed ownership) and members’ associations
with an own legal personality (Verein). Against the background that “spending power”
is the main driver of competitive advantage for clubs in the overinvestment environ-
ment of European football, the governance structure of the privately owned football
firm exhibits superior abilities to tap sources of funding and channel them into play-
ing talent. The results of the analysis are applied to current developments in German
and English football and to recent initiatives of the Football Governing Bodies.
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The concept of the paper is rooted in the tradition of comparative analysis of firm gov-
ernance structures as pioneered by Fama and Jensen (1983a) and Fama and Jensen
(1983b). According to the basic assumption of this tradition the environment, in
which football clubs operate, generates specific requirements, which not all club gov-
ernance structures are equally well suited to meet. In the resulting competition of gov-
ernance structures those best adapted to the requirements of the environment will
prevail. 
In the first step of the following analysis the specificities of the environment in
which football clubs compete nowadays will be outlined. The second step is devoted to
the comparative analysis of the three paradigmatic governance structures: privately
owned football firms, public football corporations, and member’s associations with an
own legal personality. In the final section, the results of the analysis will be applied to
current developments in German and English football and to recent initiatives of the
football governing bodies.
The Environment: Overinvestment and the Relevance of 
Spending Power
Compared to firms in other industries, professional football clubs seem to face a con-
stantly poor business environment. Based on operating profit, which is defined as
earnings before the deduction of interest payments and taxes, the recent Deloitte
Report (Deloitte, 2009) covering the last 11 years shows a sobering picture. Only two
of the “big five” European leagues have managed to deliver a moderate consolidated
operating profit during this whole time span: The Premier League and the Bundesliga.
The Ligue 1 broke even based on this restricted measure from time to time, whereas
the Serie A was in the red almost every year. The Primera Division cannot be tracked
due to missing financial information. If interest payments are included, the picture
becomes darker, since even the top-performer, the Premier League, has not managed
to deliver a collective pre-tax profit in any single year since its formation (Walters &
Hamil, 2008). This constant poor financial performance is the more astonishing since
at the same time the revenues of the “big five” have more than tripled from € 2.497 bil-
lion in 1996-97 to € 7.727 billion in 2007-08. We see a genuine paradox of inexistent
or constantly low operating profits despite almost exploding revenues. At the same
time, the football clubs have been piling up significant debt. The Premier League clubs,
for example, have accumulated liabilities amounting to £ 3.1 billion in their books as
of June 2009 (Conn, 2009). 
The mechanisms leading to this development have been analyzed in detail else-
where. Various authors have dealt with “overinvestment issues” based on the contest
structure of sport competitions.3 Starting with Franck and Müller (2000), we have
tried to formalize the basic trade-offs of “football overinvestment” in Dietl and Franck
(2000), Dietl, Franck, and Roy (2003) and Dietl, Franck, and Lang (2008). The analy-
sis shows that various factors enhance the incentives of professional football clubs to
engage in a genuine arms race and “overspend” on playing talent, among them the fol-
lowing (see also Dietl & Franck, 2007b): a stronger correlation between talent invest-
ment and winning probability, simultaneous (as opposed to consecutive) investments,
an additional exogenous prize (e.g., Champions League qualification), a system of pro-
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motion and relegation, increasing revenue differentials within a league (i.e., less rev-
enue sharing), and increasing revenue differentials between hierarchical leagues.
It seems that overinvestment is the natural outcome of both increased commercial-
ization and of the current format of competition in football.4 Various regulatory
changes leading to the current format of competition in European football have inten-
sified the incentives to overinvest. For example, the practices of seeding and group
stages in the Champions League reduce the importance of coincidence or simply luck.
The incentives to invest become more high-powered, if money buys success with a
higher probability. The strong growth of revenues in the UEFA Champions League
and the applied distribution scheme strongly favoring sportive success increase rev-
enue differentials between positions in the national championship races and create
genuine jackpots for the winners of the qualification slots. External interventions like
the Bosman ruling of the European Court of Justice may have also contributed to the
problem, as one obvious effect of eliminated talent market imperfections is again a
stronger relationship between payrolls and sportive success.5
Provided that the commercialization of professional football will continue and given
that the format of the competition will not be changed by regulatory measures it is
likely that football clubs will remain confronted with a typical arms race industry
structure in the future. Consequently, football clubs cannot be measured against the
same criteria as businesses in other industries. We know that financial profitability
decides on the viability of businesses in other industries. However, financial profitabil-
ity does not play the same role in football. The discussion of the constantly poor finan-
cial performance of football clubs is very often dominated by the view that
unfortunately football clubs are unprofitable today, but, of course, they should and
will be profitable some time in the future. This is simply not true. We should serious-
ly consider the fact that regulation and commercialization have created an overinvest-
ment environment in professional football. 
In this specific arms race environment the competitive position of a club is not
determined by its profitability, but by its spending power. The spending power of a
club depends on two factors: on the ability of the club to generate funds and on the
ability of the club to redirect generated funds to football. A club that can tap sources
of money, which its competitors are unable to tap, will increase its competitive posi-
tion in the arms race ceteris paribus. A club that succeeds to channel more of the gen-
erated funds into football instead of paying rents to different stakeholders will increase
its competitive position in the arms race ceteris paribus. Compare two clubs with dif-
ferent spending power. The club with superior tapping and channelling capabilities
will be able to outspend its competitor while still staying within the limits of its spend-
ing power. If the competitor gambles on success and spends beyond its tapping and
channelling capabilities, it risks becoming illiquid and temporarily loosing viability.6 It
follows that the biggest spending power is the true competitive advantage in the foot-
ball industry.
Note that profit requirements turn into a genuine handicap in this specific spending
power game of European football. Profit is a fraction of earnings, which cannot be
channelled back into football because it will be distributed to a group of stakeholders
called owners. Profit is a burden on the spending power of the club, which deteriorates
its competitive advantage in the contest. 
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It is important to stress that this fact does not exclude capitalistic governance struc-
tures from the football industry. Only at first sight one may draw the conclusion that
football clubs cannot be business enterprises, since normally a business enterprise pro-
duces a positive financial net result at the end of the year, which may be distributed to
its residual claimants. If it fails to do so for a couple of years in a row it will normally
go out of business, since the owners will not be able to afford or not be willing to per-
manently loose money and therefore look for alternative investments. However, capi-
talistic football club governance structures do not prohibit owners, which can afford
and are willing to permanently loose money. Chelsea, for example, lost huge amounts
of money every year since Roman Abramovich took over ownership in 2003 (Deloitte,
2009). In 2008 alone the loss before tax amounted to £ 84.5 million (Conn, 2009). As
of June 30, 2008, the interest-free loan given by Abramovich to the club to cover the
losses amounted to £ 702 million (Conn, 2009). Other motivations than just to make
a profit in football seem to lead the managerial decision processes at Chelsea, despite
the fact that Chelsea is institutionally designed in the same way as many profit-orient-
ed owner-dominated capitalistic firms in other industries. Chelsea FC is a PLC with
the parent company Chelsea Limited. The ultimate controlling party of Chelsea
Limited is Roman Abramovich. In this institutional sense Chelsea is a business enter-
prise, but one that obviously does not make a profit. Despite its financial unprofitabil-
ity Chelsea seems to provide other rewards to its owner, which exceed his financial
contributions. Otherwise he would withdraw from his football venture. Obviously,
unprofitable football businesses may still be good businesses for their owners for a
couple of other reasons.
Chelsea is competitive precisely because of the fact that its owner does not degrade
the channelling capacity of the club by extracting profits. On the contrary,
Abramovich injects huge sums of money into the club every year. Obviously Chelsea
increased its tapping capabilities without deteriorating its channelling capabilities
since Abramovich became club owner in 2003.
Many factors affect the tapping and channelling capabilities and therefore the
spending power of clubs. This paper only focuses on the influence of governance
structures. 
The Influence of Club Governance Structures on the Capability to
Channel Funds into Playing Talent
Assume three clubs have exactly the same revenues and costs and therefore the same
profit function. Furthermore, assume that every club adopts a different governance
structure. What incentives does the structure of property rights characterizing each
governance structure exert on the decision of club management to spend on playing
talent?
Structures of property rights result from the allocation of residual rights of control
and residual claims. Having the residual rights of control with respect to an asset
means having the right to make any decisions concerning the use of this asset that have
not been assigned to another person or institution by contract or by law. Being the
residual claimant means being entitled to whatever remains from the revenues after all
debts, expenses, and other contractual obligations have been paid (Milgrom &
Roberts, 1992). 
Franck
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The Club Governed as a Classical Capitalistic (Privately Owned) Firm 
The key characteristic of this governance structure is that the residual rights of control
and the residual claims are allocated to the same person, the owner. Tying together
residual claims and residual control has the consequence that the classical capitalistic
owner of a football club bears the full financial impact of his or her decisions. This
consequence of concentrated ownership is true for firm owners in all industries. 
However, concentrated ownership has an additional consequence in the football
industry. Because football games are entertainment products, the residual decisions
taken by club owners do not only have financial consequences. In addition to that, they
have a high potential to expose owners to public debate. Owner decisions can be
accepted and applauded by the fans and supporters of the club as well as by local
politicians, or they can be criticized. Being accepted by the community can be a source
of utility for the owner and a value in itself, just as the criticisms may produce disutil-
ity for him or her. The important issue is that this potential source of utility or disu-
tility for football club owners is not triggered by the level of profits but by the sportive
success of the club. The utility levels of fans, supporters, local politicians, etc. tend to
be positively correlated with the on-pitch success of the local team. It follows that the
admiration, applause, or respect of fans potentially nurturing the utility of football
club owners should also positively depend on the level of sportive success.
Figure 1 exemplifies the specific trade-off of a classical capitalistic club owner. It
seems reasonable to assume that as the club increases its winning percentage profits
rise until a certain level and then decrease and ultimately become negative. The indif-
ference curve reflecting the utility function of the owner does not run parallel to the
winning axis but instead reflects utility stemming from the public admiration coming
along with winning. The owner maximizes his or her utility by trading some of the
profits against the public support stemming from sportive success. 
Figure 1. Comparative Analysis of Governance Structures
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The Club Governed as Public Corporation (Stock Corporation with Dispersed
Ownership)
There is a broad consensus in the literature that the stockholders are not the holders
of the residual rights of control in the public corporation (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).
Stockholders do have rights, for example they can elect directors, vote on the corpo-
rate charter or on “organic changes.” But their voting and decision rights are exactly
enumerated and delimited and therefore not residual. Stockholders have no say in
investment and acquisition decisions, no influence on hiring managers and on decid-
ing their pay, and stockholders do not vote on business strategies, product prices, firm
locations, etc. In contrast to the classical capitalistic owner, the stockholders of the
modern corporation do not run the business. 
However, there is a broad consensus in the literature that the stockholders are resid-
ual claimants. They receive the dividends and in case of liquidation of the firm, they
appropriate the remaining profit after payment of debt and taxes (Milgrom & Roberts,
1992).
The separation of residual control and residual claims in the modern corporation
allows the strong dispersion and the trading of shares on secondary markets (Fama &
Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). Compared to the classical capitalist, the typical stockholder of
the modern corporation holds a small share, is anonymous, and assumes no other role
in the firm than that of a passive investor. Being situated in the market and not in the
firm he or she is not exposed to the typical trade-off between profits and winning. He
or she compares alternative investments solely on the basis of shareholder value.
Stocks of football clubs will be included into the portfolios of passive investors if they
outperform the stocks of car manufacturers, chemical companies, banks, insurers, etc.
in terms of risk-adjusted return.
Coming back to the graphical illustration (Figure 1), the indifference curve repre-
senting the utility function of the typical stockholder of a modern football corpora-
tion will run parallel to the winning axis. Utility is only triggered by profits, which can
be seen as the long-term driver of shareholder value. Public pressure or public admi-
ration triggered by the sportive success of the club have no direct channel to the utili-
ty function of the anonymous shareholder managing his own diversified portfolio of
investments. In sum the modern football corporation has inferior channelling capabil-
ities compared to the classical capitalistic firm. The anonymous modern capitalist will
be less willing to waive profits and therefore channel less money into playing talent.
The Club Governed as a Members’ Association with an Own Legal Personality
(Verein)
The governance structure of the members’ association (called eingetragener Verein) is
still dominant in German football. The Verein is a non-profit organization whose
members democratically elect representatives to take over management functions for
specified election periods. The Verein has its own legal personality, which means that
liability is limited to the assets of the Verein and that the representatives cannot be held
personally liable for the actions of the Verein (except in the case of fraud).7 Therefore,
in Germany the Verein—and not its officers—engages into business and financial
transactions. 
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How are the property rights distributed in the Verein? The residual rights of control
are allocated to the members, the fans, who vote on important strategic issues in a
membership meeting. The residual rights of control are not transferable (there is no
market on which members could sell their rights to vote in a membership meeting).
Every member has one vote. Residual claims are inexistent. Due to the non-profit sta-
tus of the Verein, profits cannot be distributed. This property rights structure has a
variety of implications (see Dietl & Franck, 2007b, for a detailed discussion). Here, we
will only consider its effect on the clubs’ choice between profits and winning.
The non-distribution constraint leaves no room at all for financial investors. Since
nobody can extract a profit, utility can only be derived from the sportive success and
fame of the club and only subjects interested in the latter have reasons to self-select as
fans and become members. Coming back to the graphical illustration (Figure 1), the
indifference curve of the fans as holders of residual control should run parallel to the
profit axis. It seems plausible that the members of the Verein will induce their repre-
sentatives to spend all revenues on playing strength. However, it seems unlikely that
members should prefer systematic overspending in subsequent periods and therefore
risk the existence of the club, to which they are attached.8
Conclusion: Superior Channeling Capabilities of the Verein
Remember the initial assumption of three clubs having the same revenues, costs, and
profit function, but different governance structures. In this artificial “ceteris paribus”
setting focusing solely on the channeling capabilities of the different governance struc-
tures, the Verein is able to outspend the classical capitalistic (owner-dominated) firm
and field the stronger team, automatically redirecting all revenues back into football
(Figure 1). The structure of a public corporation would make the club the least com-
petitive on the pitch because its owners do not even trade profits against public admi-
ration like the classical capitalist. 
The Influence of Club Governance Structures on the Capability to
Tap Sources of Funding 
We will now study how club governance structures affect the abilities of clubs to tap
various sources of funding and increase their spending power.
Capturing the Willingness to Pay Financial Spillovers to Other Businesses
There is a long business practice in the US to use major league sports teams as vehicles
to promote other businesses that may be more valuable than the sports team itself.9
The perception of the sports team as a unit generating positive financial spillovers for
parallel businesses in a conglomerate is also relevant in European football. Mohamed
Al Fayed, the proprietor of Harrods and the Hotel Ritz in Paris, is the funder of
Fulham, which he owns through Mafco Holdings Limited, a Bermuda (tax heaven)
company. In cases like these, the value of additional units of talent increasing the play-
ing strength of the team is not calculated based on their contribution to the football
business alone but also based on the value added to the related businesses. 
When it comes to tapping this additional source of funds resulting from spillovers
to other businesses the structure of the Verein is clearly handicapped by the built-in
non-tradability of the residual rights of control. Suppose, for example, that a private
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regional broadcasting network in the Ruhr area in Germany recognizes that the Verein
Schalke 04 would be a perfect promotional vehicle. One option for the broadcasting
network would be to enter into a sponsoring deal with Schalke 04. However, the influ-
ence of the sponsor on the internal decision processes at Schalke and the possibilities
to really manage and capture positive spillovers are rather limited, as the fans do not
perceive the sponsor as the decision maker behind potential success. An additional
vehicle would be for the owner of the broadcasting network to become a personal
member of the Verein and hope to get voted into the position of a representative at the
members’ meeting. In the best-case scenario the owner of the broadcasting network
and sponsor of the Verein will become president for the election period and be able to
influence decision processes and capture spillovers. However, the fragility of this con-
struct is substantial, as the president can be voted down at the next members’ meeting.
The president may try to buy votes by promising fringe benefits to certain opinion
leaders among the members or even by clandestinely offering money. The crucial
point is that he cannot write down an enforceable contract on the trade of a single vot-
ing right. Such a contract would be illegal.
Herein lies the great difference to capitalistic governance structures. If the club was
a company, the owner of the broadcasting network could legally buy its shares. Once
holding the majority of shares, he or she would possess the rights of residual control.
He would be able to make decisions in order to manage and capture spillovers and
nobody would ever have the option to vote him or her down. 
Note that this logic implies that the modern corporation offers very limited abilities
to tap the willingness to pay for financial spillovers. Suppose Schalke 04 was a modern
corporation owned by dispersed anonymous shareholders. The precondition for the
broadcasting network to actively manage spillovers and employ Schalke as a promo-
tional vehicle would be to buy enough shares in order to gain residual control. This is
tantamount to transforming Schalke into a classical capitalistic firm with concentrat-
ed ownership.
Summarizing the discussion, the governance structures of the Verein and the mod-
ern corporation are less suited to capture the financial effects of football spillovers to
other related areas of business. The privately owned football firm is the superior struc-
ture for tapping the willingness to pay for spillovers to other businesses since it auto-
matically allocates residual control to the owner. The owner may buy a famous player
and add him to the squad because the generated interest and excitement around the
deal creates value for the owner’s current real estate development around the stadium,
his or her broadcasting network or his or her investment firm. 
Capturing the Willingness to Pay for Social and Political Acceptance
For the owner of Fulham, Mohamed Al-Fayed, the excitement produced by the foot-
ball team may generate additional customers in his other businesses, first of all at
Harrods. However, these financial spillovers may be less important than something,
which may be called social and political externalities. Al-Fayed’s way to wealth has not
been free of criticism (BBCNEWS.com, 2008a; Guardianlies.com, 1990). For example,
Al-Fayed and his brother Ali bought House of Frazer in 1985, a group that included
Harrods. A Department of Trade inquiry into the deal stated that the Al-Fayed broth-
ers had not reported the truth about their wealth and background. A competitor
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accused the Al-Fayed brothers of stealing millions in jewels from the Harrods safe
deposit box. The dispute was settled after the competitor died with a payment to his
widow. Other scandals followed; for example, Mohamed Al-Fayed offered money for
questions in the House of Commons to the Conservative MPs Neil Hamilton and Tim
Smith, who then had to leave in disgrace. As a result of the turbulences Al-Fayed was
denied British citizenship, although he sought to receive it for years. In this setting, a
football club may be seen as an element in a personal holding structure, which gener-
ates what is most needed: social and political acceptance.
The case of Roman Abramovich, the owner of Chelsea, may be interpreted in a sim-
ilar context. His typical Russian oligarch path to wealth is scattered with questionable
practices. The list of alleged rule violations to be inspected in detail on the internet (see
e.g., Winter, 2008) goes from illegal share-dillution to involvement in gangland wars.
The fate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, another Russian oligarch imprisoned and sent to
Siberian jail, before his eyes, Abramovich has presumably been aware of his fragile per-
sonal situation. He cooperated with the Russian government by accepting the position
of governor of Chukokta from 2000 to 2008. He spent $1.3 billion from his own for-
tune to improve living standards in the impoverished region in the Russian Far East.
Abramovich’s first term of office would have expired in 2005 but President Putin
changed the law and abolished elections for regional governors. Abramovich had to
continue until the new president, Medvedev, accepted Abramovich’s request to resign
in July 2008. He promised that various charitable activities would continue. Moreover,
Abramovich reduced his financial exposure in Russia by selling his Aeroflot shares to
the Russian State and his Sibneft shares to Gazprom. Abramovich counts as one of the
best-protected businessmen worldwide, employing a 40-person private security staff.
Even without detailed information about the structure of businesses united in the
Abramovich holding, social and political acceptance could be a desirable asset. In this
context the investment in Chelsea makes Abramovich a well-known personality in
England and Western Europe and generates legitimacy. 
Are all governance structures discussed so far equally well suited to tap this addi-
tional source of money paid for social and political acceptance?
Obviously the Verein is clearly out of competition again due to its built-in non-trad-
ability of the residual rights of control. Abramovich could act as a sponsor and per-
haps hope to be voted as president, but he would have to live with the risk to be voted
down at the next members’ meeting. There is no enforceable contract guaranteeing
residual control. Therefore, the Verein does not provide a framework for buying social
and political acceptance. 
The modern corporation is out of this business segment as well. Individuals with a
disputable way of wealth appropriation seeking for a vehicle to buy social and politi-
cal acceptance and gain legitimacy will not be able to send any signals to the public as
anonymous shareholders of a football corporation. Instead they need to be identified
as individuals with the decisions of the club and as a consequence with the excitement
generated by sportive success. It follows that only the governance structure of the clas-
sical capitalistic (owner-dominated) firm can tap this additional source of funding
resulting from the willingness to pay for legitimacy.
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Capturing the Willingness to Pay for Ownership as a Consumptive Activity
In May 2007, Thaksin Shinawatra, exiled former Prime Minister of Thailand, suspend-
ed from office and found guilty for cheating the elections by the Supreme Court in 2006,
posted an offer to buy Manchester City for the sum of £ 81.6 million. The shareholders
accepted the offer on June 21, 2007. On the same day Shinawatra was accused for cor-
ruption in Thailand and subsequently found guilty (BBCNEWS.com, 2008b). His assets
were frozen and the club had to borrow £ 25 million against the forthcoming seasons’
TV money in order to continue operations. On the verge of bankruptcy Sheikh Mansour
bin Zayed al Nahyan stepped in and took over 90% of the shares.
Sheikh Mansour is a member of the Royal Family of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab
Emirates (Armitstead, 2008). He is Minister of Presidential Affairs for the President,
his half brother, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan. Moreover, he is the Chairman of
First Gulf Bank, of the International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) and of
the Emirates Horse Racing Authority (EHRA) among other things. His personal
wealth is estimated at £ 33 billion, while the family fortune is around £ 550 billion.
It is not entirely clear but at least very unlikely that Sheikh Mansour has invested in
order to generate financial spillovers to his other businesses, as the link between the
excitement produced by the team on the pitch in England and the International
Petroleum Investment Company or the First Gulf Bank seems rather weak. Moreover,
we cannot exactly know if Sheikh Mansour is seeking social and political acceptance
through his investment. However, given that there is no significant social and political
pressure on the Royal Family of Abu Dhabi and that their leadership is widely accept-
ed by the people, it seems unlikely that Sheikh Mansour bought the club in order to
gain legitimacy and prepare his emigration to England. 
Why did he then buy the club? Perhaps Sheikh Mansour, who also has a passion for
high class race horses, bought the club for the same reason he spent money on his stud:
to enjoy himself. Rosen (1981) has explained the phenomenon of imperfect substitu-
tion among quality differentiated goods. The utility derived from certain consumptive
activities tends to increase more than proportionally with the quality of the consumed
good or service. We prefer to listen to an excellent singer instead of listening twice to
a singer with half the talent. We prefer to watch an outstanding film to watching two
films of mediocre quality. Our consumption choices are, of course, restricted by budg-
et constraints. Sheikh Mansour’s budget constraints allowed him to own and “con-
sume” a high-quality team in the strongest football league of the world. 
It is unclear if the example is really well-chosen. However, there is no reason a pri-
ori to exclude football clubs from the list of potential objects of consumption for afflu-
ent individuals. The type of sportsman-owner, who is not a rent-seeker but a mere
consumer has a long tradition in the development of professional sports. The differ-
ence today lies in the fact that ownership of a “high quality object of consumption” in
football has become very expensive due to the commercialization and economic devel-
opment of the game. Sportsman-owners nowadays can only come from a restricted
group of very wealthy people. Since the rapid accumulation of wealth is only possible
in environments with systematic market failures and regulatory deficits, huge wealth
is probably often linked with legitimacy deficits. It goes without saying that in reality
the motivations of club owners may be more complex and vary over time. Chelsea’s
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Roman Abramovich may be a sportsman-owner, a legitimacy-seeker, and a manager
promoting his other business activities at the same time. 
Coming back to the question if all governance structures discussed so far are equal-
ly well suited to tap this additional source of funding paid by sportsman-owners, the
assessment of the last section can simply be repeated. The Verein and the modern cor-
poration do not provide a legal framework for the affluent sportsman to gain residual
control over the desired object of consumption. 
Capturing the Willingness to Pay for Money Laundering
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body
devoted to the protection of the global financial system against money laundering and
terrorist financing. Its latest report published in July 2009 deals with the topic of
money laundering in the football sector (FATF, 2009). Without going into details here
the report argues that football is highly vulnerable to the activities of criminals seek-
ing new channels to launder the proceeds of their illegal activities.  
Football clubs are characterized as ideal vehicles for money laundering purposes
because first many high value cash transactions and second substantial cross border
money flows are part of their normal business model. Money laundering practices
range from the simple injection of criminal money into the business cycle by buying
seats at the regular games of the club to complex international player transfer deals
involving investor groups constituted in tax heavens. The FATF report does not deliv-
er any clear evidence, but instead describes as many as 17 paradigmatic cases in order
to highlight the vulnerabilities of the sector and provide guidance to law enforcement
agencies.
Comparing the described governance structures as potential enablers of money
laundering, the Verein and the modern corporation are again severely “handicapped.”
Neither membership in a Verein nor shareholding in a modern corporation provide
access to the internal high value cash transactions and cross border money flows of the
football club. The inexistence of residual claims in combination with the non-tradabil-
ity of residual control transforms the Verein into a local fan cooperative, which by def-
inition cannot be constituted and managed in foreign tax havens.
It is clear that ownership of football clubs by investors or investor groups constitut-
ed in tax heavens is not illegal and does not automatically imply money laundering.
However, according to the FATF report it makes money laundering much easier. It is
informative in this context that, according to Conn (2009), the majority of Premier
League clubs are owned by individuals through trusts registered in tax heavens. 
Capturing the Willingness to Pay for Gate Attendance, Broadcasting, and Sponsoring
Concerning the more classical sources of club income stemming from gate attendance,
broadcasting, and sponsoring, the results are less obvious when it comes to the level of
earnings. However, the different governance forms should affect the structure of earn-
ings. It goes without saying that market sizes, market structures, etc. affect the revenues
in every market covered by the following analysis. For example, it makes a difference
for the selling of TV rights if the TV market of a country is large or small, monopolis-
tic or competitive, etc. We abstract from these differences not because they are unim-
portant, but because we want to isolate the (additional) effects of club governance
structures. 
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Stigler and Becker (1977) have argued in their seminal article that the utility, which
a consumer is able to derive from the present “consumption” of certain goods, depends
on the “consumption capital” accumulated by this actor through previous “consump-
tion” of these goods. Typical “connoisseur goods,” where previous experience increas-
es enjoyment, are to be found in the areas of music, art, cuisine, literature, or wine.
Adler (1985) has advanced this “connoisseur theory” arguing that the utility of a con-
noisseur does not only depend on its own past consumption, but also on the sum of
co-specific consumption capital acquired by all fellow connoisseurs, with whom he
can exchange views and enjoy interaction.10 Genuine football fans following the games
and activities of “their” club sometimes for their whole life are perhaps the perfect
incarnation of this theory of beneficial addiction. Presumably a true fan with all the
accumulated context knowledge enjoys a remarkable game of his club more than an
occasional spectator coming along incidentally. Moreover, fans of the same club enjoy
interacting in a group of like-minded people, for example, by sharing the joy of a great
performance.
The other side of the coin described as beneficial addiction is the emerging phenom-
enon of loyalty. Hirschman (1970) has studied phenomena of loyalty in the economic
process and institutional reactions to them. In normal circumstances when an organi-
zation delivers bad performance to potential customers they will chose “exit” and switch
to alternative suppliers. However, this standard market mechanism of disciplining own-
ers and management of an underperforming organization fails when consumers are
loyal (Hamil, Michie, Oughton, & Warby, 2000). Football fans will not be able to sim-
ply walk away and support a different team if their club delivers poor quality or charges
high prices. They are not able to protect their consumption capital, which can be viewed
as a club-specific investment, by using the “exit mechanism.” Following Hirschman
(1970) the lack of “exit” can be compensated by the introduction of “voice.” Supporters
with “voice” in the decision processes of the club will be more inclined to cultivate “ben-
eficial addiction” as they possess an instrument to safeguard their specific investments.
Moreover, they have an instrument to discipline what they perceive to be poor club
management by voting against undesired projects and persons.
It follows that the owner-dominated capitalistic firm, as well as the modern football
corporation, can and will probably choose to have supporters’ representatives on their
boards. They will do so because it is in the best interest of the owners to manage “ben-
eficial fan addiction.” However, there is a limit on what can be managed. The limit
stands out clearly when looking at the classical capitalistic firm. The Abramovich-type
owner cannot credibly cede residual control to another party, unless he sells the major-
ity of shares to this party. Fans may be invited to give their opinion, but they obvious-
ly cannot vote down projects against Roman Abramovich or even vote down Roman
Abramovich. They could choose not to support the club any longer, but, as has been
said, their “exit” option is severely disturbed through loyalty phenomena. The gover-
nance structure of the Verein stands in stark contrast here.11 The absence of residual
claims and the definition of non-tradable residual rights of control create a perfect
voice-mechanism for supporter-members. Members of the Verein possess an instru-
ment to safeguard their club-specific consumption capital and to discipline manage-
ment.
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How do these governance differences affect the capabilities of clubs to tap earnings
from gate attendance, TV broadcasting rights, and sponsoring (see also Dietl &
Franck, 2007b)?
It seems likely that the Verein will attract more supporters ceteris paribus. On the
one hand fans with residual control should be more inclined to build up loyalty. On
the other hand fans with residual control will probably vote for lower ticket prices.
Better attended and at the same time cheaper-to-attend games do not automatically
lead to higher earnings. The fan orientation of the Verein should at the same time be
highly attractive for sponsors. The objective of sponsors is to get attention. More fans
translate into more attention for the sponsor. Moreover, the non-distribution con-
straint of the Verein could be interpreted as a signal in this context: the sponsors know
for sure that their contributions cannot be appropriated by any residual claimants, but
instead will be invested to maximize sportive success and therefore attention.12
A league with the majority of clubs organized along the Verein ideology will be more
fan-driven and this is likely to also materialize in its TV deals. Where “football belongs
to the fans”—to use the recurring slogan in Germany—public and political discussion
will limit the options of the league to make an income-maximizing deal when selling
TV rights. Access to football is almost viewed as a human right, with the result that the
package is twisted toward a higher free TV exposure. The low prices owed to this spe-
cific “football belongs to the fan” environment will be somewhat compensated by
sponsorship receipts, as sponsors and commercial partners are interested in high pub-
lic exposure.
The following data, which is extracted from various sources (Deloitte, 2009;
Bundesliga.de, 2009; Soccernet.com, 2009) is quite in line with this analysis (see Table
1). The Bundesliga continues to outperform the other “big five” leagues in terms of
average match attendance with a number of 42,000 spectators per game in the 2008-
09 season. It is followed by the Premier League, with an average match attendance of
35,650. Despite its well-attended games, the Bundesliga “only” generated € 338 million
in matchday income compared to the € 700 million of the Premier League in the 2007-
08 season. Only part of this effect can be attributed to the lower number of games in
the 18-team Bundesliga compared to the 20-team Premier League. The main reason
for the difference lies in the much lower admission prices in the Bundesliga, average-
ing € 20,79 compared to € 51 in the Premier League in the 2008-09 season. The broad-
casting income of the Bundesliga amounts to a disappointing € 476 million when
compared to the € 1.176 billion of the Premier League in 2007-08 season. However, in
line with the theoretical arguments presented above, the Bundesliga is able to compen-
sate some of the revenue disadvantages through its appeal to sponsors and commer-
cial partners. Commercial revenue, composed of sponsorship and merchandising
receipts, is by far the largest revenue stream of the Bundesliga amounting to € 634 mil-
lion representing 43% of all revenues in 2007-08. Here, the Premier League comes sec-
ond after the Bundesliga with a commercial revenue of € 565 million, amounting to
23% of all its revenues in 2007-08. 
Conclusions
Provided that “spending power” is the main driver of competitive advantage for clubs
in the arms race environment of European football and considering the tapping and
Volume 5 • Number 2 • 2010 • IJSF 121
Governance Structures in European Football
canalizing capabilities of the different club governance structures some conclusions
can be drawn.
The Instability of the German Regulatory Environment 
The governance structure of the Verein is characterized by inferior capabilities to tap
sources of funding originating from wealthy individuals who are trying to capture
spillovers to other businesses, seeking social and political acceptance, laundering
money, or who are interested in consumption as sportsman owners.
Moreover, the fan orientation of the “Verein set up” limits the possibilities to design
and implement income-maximizing attendance and TV pricing schemes. Against the
background that the Bundesliga operates in a potentially very attractive football mar-
ket (Germany has a population of 82 million compared to the 50 million inhabitants
of England; football is the number one sport in Germany with more than 6 million
registered football players compared to just more than one million in England) the
reported revenues of the Bundesliga are rather disappointing. Whereas the Premier
League clubs were able to tap sources of funding totaling revenues of € 2,441 billion in
the 2007-08 season, the Bundesliga clubs only generated revenues of € 1,438 billion
(Deloitte, 2009). 
Consequently, the German clubs are no longer competitive at the highest European
level: in the period 1999-2003 four semi-finalists in the Champions League came from
Germany whereas in the period 2004-2008 this number fell to a disappointing zero. At
the same time the Premier League augmented the number of semi-finalists from three
in the period 1999-2003 to an impressive 10 in the period 2004-2008. 
Why do German football clubs then not change their governance structures? Until
the year 2000 the statutes of the German Federation ruled that German professional
football teams must be pure members’ associations. The pressure of the clubs for
change led to the introduction of a new regulatory framework in the year 2000. Among
other things it gave clubs the option to separate the professional football operations
and spin them off into a commercial company. However, the crucial precondition for
this reorganization is known as the “50%+1 vote” rule: the members’ club must con-
Table 1: Bundesliga versus Premier League
Bundesliga Premier League
Average match attendance 42,000 35,650
(season 2008-09)
Matchday income (€) 338 700
(season 2007-08)
Average admission price (€) 20.79 51
(season 2008-09)   
Broadcasting income (€) 476 1,176
(season 2007-08)   
Commercial revenue (€) 634 565
(season 2007-08)   
Note. Based on Bundesliga.de (2009), Deloitte (2009), Soccernet.com (2009)
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tinue to hold at least 50% plus one of the voting rights in the commercial company,
thus retaining residual control of professional football operations. 
To this restriction, only two exceptions exist, VfL Wolfsburg and Bayer Leverkusen.
The professional football team Bayer Leverkusen has been transformed from a Verein
into a GmbH, a limited liability company, in 1999, and the Bayer AG (the Bayer cor-
poration) has been granted the exception to take over 100% of the shares in the
GmbH. The professional team of VfL Wolfsburg, German champion in 2009, had been
transformed from a Verein into a GmbH in 2001 and the Volkswagen AG (the
Volkswagen corporation), has been granted the exception to hold 90% of the shares in
the GmbH. This means that there are two firms with a dominant owner in German
football. However, this dominant owner is not an individual, but a public corporation
in both cases. Apart from these two exceptions all existing German football companies
are still members’ clubs in essence, because they are majority-owned and controlled by
their parent Verein. In sum the German regulatory environment has successfully
blocked away private owners from football.
Today the German clubs are entirely aware of the fact that the governance reform
introduced in the year 2000 did little to increase their capabilities to tap new financial
sources. Complaining about the decline of the competitive position of German foot-
ball in Europe, an increasing number of German football stakeholders pushes toward
the abolishment of the “50%+1 vote” rule (see e.g., Kicker.de, 2008; Goal.com, 2009;
Sport1.de, 2009). It could be only a matter of time until the Bundesliga will open to
the new sources of funding provided by private owners with the described complex
motivations.
The Going Private Transactions in English Football     
Of almost 30 clubs in England that have at some stage been listed on a recog-
nized stock market, only seven remain. . . . Whilst some clubs have opted for
a delisting to reduce the regulatory burden and associated costs, over the past
four years many of the delistings have resulted from new owners taking a club
from public to private ownership. (Deloitte, 2009, p. 58)
The analysis of governance structures sheds some light on this trend. Modern foot-
ball corporations have inferior tapping and channelling capabilities compared to pri-
vately owned football firms: they cannot mobilize money injections by wealthy
individuals looking for spillovers to other businesses, political and social acceptance,
consumptive ownership, or access to cash transactions with money laundering poten-
tial. Moreover, small shareholders benchmark the performance of their football stock
against alternative investments in their portfolio and deteriorate the spending power
of the football club demanding a competitive profit. 
Why did almost 30 clubs in England then go public in the past? One reason might
be that the spending power contest was less accentuated in the past when the relation-
ship between payrolls and field success was weaker, the revenue differentials within
and between leagues were smaller, etc. An additional reason could be that investors
needed some time to learn that the football industry is organized as a contest with
potential overinvestment in playing strength. Seen from this perspective the £ 175 mil-
lion generated by English Premier League clubs through stock market listings have
been an apprenticeship premium paid by investors.
Governance Structures in European Football
The Deloitte analysis of the key trends in Premier League clubs’ financing since 1992
is entirely in line with the theoretical expectations.13 The most important source of
funding being the £ 950 million injected by “new owners” compared to 350 million
attributed to securitization, 300 million originating from strategic media investment,
175 million generated through stock exchange listing, and 150 million contributed by
new player finance techniques. Of course, money injected for laundering purposes
cannot be tracked.
The ‘Financial Instability’ Debate Will End up in ‘Enhanced Licensing’
In the last years, the European Commission, the European Parliament, National Sports
Ministers, the International Governing Bodies of Sports, etc. started various initiatives
like the Independent European Sports Review, the White Paper Process on Sports, the
Financial Fair Play Task Force, etc., which indicate a certain level of discomfort with
the current situation among important stakeholder groups of European football. An
important source of discomfort stems from the arms race in European football, which
is perceived as a danger for the financial stability of many clubs and seen as a systemic
risk at the level of entire competitions.
Economic theory makes clear prescriptions as to how problems of overinvestment
in contests could be reduced. Employing Akerlofs’ metaphor of a “rat race” (Akerlof,
1976), three distinct instruments stand out: 
1. Redistribute the “cheese”: Implement more revenue sharing measures in order to
reduce the income differentials within and between leagues.
2. Bring back “luck”: Introduce k.o. instead of group stages, stop seeding, etc. in
order to make the outcome more a result of lucky circumstances.
3. Handicap the “rats”: Design salary caps, roster restrictions, etc. in order to limit
the “calories” that can be invested in the race. 
All these instruments imply major changes to the current format of the competition.
However, the discussions, which took place in the last years in the governing bodies of
European football, show that the format of the competition seems to be carved into
stone. 
Therefore, UEFA has pursued a more moderate approach in the past. Expressed in
Akerlof ’s metaphor of the “rat race,” the UEFA strategy has only been to “keep the rats
alive” during the “race.” The licensing system introduced by UEFA at the start of the
2004-05 season pursues the objective that every club entering European competitions
should be able to pay its bills during the contest.
It seems likely that the licensing system will remain the main instrument of UEFA
to increase financial stability in European football. There is current work to improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of the licensing system. One important area of innova-
tion is how to encourage clubs to adopt more sustainable business models and more
forward-looking management attitudes. Spending within the limits of “the own
means” in a given season is an important goal. But, at the same time, encouraging
behavior, which does not deteriorate but instead develops future spending power, is an
additional issue of the “enhanced licensing” system.
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Endnotes
1 Keynote lecture given at the “First European Conference in Sports Economics,” Centre
d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, September 14-15, 2009.
2 In a very recent paper inspired by the ongoing financial crisis in football and by corporate gov-
ernance reforms outside football, Walters and Hamil (2008) reassess the corporate governance
of the entire English football industry and derive clear recommendations, which include the
introduction of a licensing system, the application of a more rigorous fit and proper person test
and stronger sporting sanctions for clubs in administration. Clearly, these measures apply at the
level of the whole industry.
3 Important concepts in the literature are: “Hyperinvestment” in sports contests (as described by
Alchian and Demsetz [1972]), “Rat race” phenomena in contests (as studied by Akerlof [1976]),
or “Destructive competition” in the market for star athletes (as treated by Whitney [1993]).
4 While most of the conditions triggering “overinvestment” are industry specific, there is quite
some variation in the propensity to incur losses and accumulate debt among the “big five”
leagues. According to the latest UEFA benchmarking report (see UEFA [2009]), the tendency to
overspend and gamble on success is much less pronounced in the Bundesliga than for example
in the Premier League. In this context governance structures can be interpreted as contractual
“remedies.” As will be shown in this paper, the governance structure of the Verein creates a
rather “sugar daddy”-hostile environment. Managers of a Verein, therefore, should better know
that they have to rely on football-related income and live within their own means than their col-
leagues in football firms, who have the option to find an owner willing to inject money and
cover the losses in the future. Of course, the relative financial discipline of the Bundesliga could
also be the result of a governance device introduced at the league level: the licensing system,
which is considered to be a benchmark for the development of instruments to secure financial
stability in European club football.  
5 Although the closer relationship between wage bills and sporting performance seems straight-
forward from a theoretical perspective, clear empirical evidence has not been provided so far. In
the paper of Frick (2005), who analyzes sources of sportive and economic success in the German
Bundesliga, are at least two indications in favor of this hypothesis. First, the coefficient of the
interaction term between a linear time trend and the team wage bill is significant and positive
in the estimation using sportive performance as dependent variable. Second, the wage sum,
which maximizes sportive success increases slightly after the Bosman ruling (from the 2.94-fold
to the 3.07-fold of the average of all teams).
6 Stefan Szymanski has made the good point that clubs, which are no longer able to pay their
bills and go bankrupt, will hardly ever dissolve. Instead they go through administration and then
reappear again in a lower league. In this sense the football system has an inbuilt mechanism to
handle overinvestment without leading to ultimate failures. Therefore I speak about a tempo-
rary loss of viability in the text. See e.g., Szymanski (2010) for a detailed discussion of the sta-
bility of football clubs despite the public perception of unstable businesses. 
7 Szymanski (2008) has explained in detail how a major institutional difference between English
and continental European club laws came into being. As a reflection of the idea that the state
should not intervene at all in the associative activities of its citizens, members’ associations in
England differ in one important respect from the German Verein and from members’ associa-
tions in most continental European countries: they have no legal personality. Therefore, the offi-
cers of the club are personally in charge of all the business and financial transactions and remain
personally liable for debts and damages. For this reason, English football clubs all became lim-
ited liability companies when the football competition started to require substantial investment
in stadia and players. Whereas British citizens had an absolute right to freedom of speech or
assembly and needed no permission or license, the rules of associative activities were not per-
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ceived as lying outside the jurisdiction of the state in Germany and also in continental Europe.
The necessity to obtain a license to assembly led to the development of club laws, which also
included the concept of a legal personality at the club level.
8 The elected representatives of the Verein running the operations during the legislation period
can be interpreted as the agents of the members. There are reasons to assume that their incen-
tives to increase playing strength are even more high-powered due to their visibility at the top
of the organization and due to their limited terms of office. Representatives may tend to even
overstate the importance of sporting success compared to normal fans as they will personally be
identified with periods of fame and glory of the club without being personally liable for finan-
cial losses. This setting may encourage a propensity to even overspend and “gamble on success”
(see Dietl and Franck [2007b]).
9  Sometimes “producing losses” and therefore reducing profits in other areas of entrepreneural
activities in order to optimize tax payments is also a form of spillover management.
10 See Brandes, Franck, and Nüesch (2008), Franck and Nüesch (2007), Franck and Nüesch
(2008) for empirical applications of these theories to football.
11 The supporters’ trust movement in England (see e.g., Hamil, Michie, Oughton, and Warby
(2000) can be interpreted as a remedy to the absence of voice mechanisms for fans in a league
with clubs governed as firms. A supporters’ trust is a non-profit-organization of fans attempt-
ing to gain influence over the running of the club they support. Normally, supporters’ trusts buy
shares in the club and use the mechanism of ownership to gain representation on the board.
According to Supporters Direct (2010), supporters’ trusts have been established at over 160
clubs with more than 120,000 fans as members. 
12 See Hansmann (1980) for the interpretation of the non-distribution constraint as a signal that
the contributions of the patrons of a non-profit organization (donators, sponsors, etc.) remain
committed to the pursuit of the desired goals, because they cannot be appropriated by residual
claimants.
13 See Deloitte, 2009, p. 58.
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